Abstract
I. Introduction
This article challenges the dominant narrative 2 that the apartheid system in South Africa was a crime against humanity under customary international law giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. 3 However nothing in this article should be read as condoning the gross violations of human rights that resulted from the policies of apartheid in South Africa. The contemporary significance of the topic should not be underestimated either because, notwithstanding the formal end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the term continues to be applied in a number of contexts (particularly in relation to Israel and Palestine) 4 and consequently remains important in understanding the legal basis of a continuing rhetorical discourse.
The unique element in the criminalization of apartheid at the international level was that it sought to impose individual criminal responsibility on conduct that was explicitly lawful in the territory in which it occurred. It is hoped that a forensic examination of the process of criminalization of a particularly egregious form of systematic racial discrimination may prove useful should the international community be minded to criminalize similar conduct (such as systematic discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) in the future.
Given the widespread human suffering that resulted from the policies of apartheid in South Africa, the wish to label these policies as a crime against humanity as part of a process of stigmatization (and delegitimization) is entirely understandable.
The desire to apply this toxic label to similar examples of widespread human suffering is equally understandable. However, with regard to the crime of apartheid, there has been a marked tendency to 'short-circuit' the voluntarist approach to the creation of customary international criminal law and a willingness to present 'oughts'
(de lege ferenda) as 'ises' (lex lata). 
II. The Crime of Apartheid prior to the Rome Statute

A. Introduction
Although the term apartheid is usually used to describe the South African policy of racial classification and segregation between 1948 and 1994 (the apartheid era), the practice of racial discrimination in South Africa pre-dates the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948. The first United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution expressing concern regarding racial discrimination in South Africa was passed in December 1946. 11 What distinguishes the apartheid era is the systematic manner in which the Nationalist Party formalized their policies of racial discrimination through legislation and the brutality of the enforcement mechanisms established to implement them.
In the early UNGA debates over the question of apartheid in South Africa, the described as a technicality and the voting record on this issue (which was combined with the reference to violations of the economic and political rights of an indigenous population) was 59 to six with 25 abstentions. 24 The Memorandum of Law also fails to address the implications of the sparse ratification of the 1968 Convention in asserting its customary effect.
C. The Apartheid Convention
Article I(1) of the Apartheid Convention provides that
The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law.
One question that has divided the commentators is the scope of application of the Apartheid Convention. Article II of the Apartheid Convention states that, 'For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "the crime of apartheid", which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts ...'.
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The wording of Article II makes it clear that the Convention also applies to similar policies of racial discrimination as practised in South West Africa (now Namibia) and (Southern) Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the wording of Article II is even wide enough to encompass Portuguese colonial policies in Mozambique and Angola. in instruments adopted both before and after the fall of apartheid notably Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute. 27 Dugard also notes that a number of states have ratified or acceded to the Apartheid Convention since the end of apartheid in South Africa. 28 With respect, neither the fact that subsequent international conventions abandon the apparent geographical restrictions contained in Article II of the Apartheid Convention (and, in the case of Additional Protocol I, this conclusion is doubtful) nor the fact that states continue to ratify the Apartheid Convention supports the contention that the Apartheid Convention itself was intended to apply to situations other than southern Africa. The first argument is a non sequitor and the second argument is based on an unsupported assumption about the reality of a causal connection that, even if it existed, could not rewrite the Apartheid Convention.
Clark submits that the Apartheid Convention was not intended to be limited to practices occurring in southern Africa on the grounds that Article II 'is drafted so as to "include" the cases of southern Africa, but not exclusive to them'. 29 . 46 The school student-led Soweto Uprising began on 16 June 1976. Over 170 people were killed and, on 19 June 1976, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution (by consensus) strongly condemning the South African government for its resort to violence against school children and affirming 'that the policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind'. SC Res. 392 (1976 Suffice it to say that this five-decade effort was controversial from the start, although it was not put out of its misery until 1996 when the Commission "concluded" its work with a "Code". falling within a number of prescribed categories and committed with a political objective during that period provided that the formal requirements of the amnesty process had been complied with.
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In its Final Report, the TRC affirmed that, in its judgment, apartheid, as a system of systematic racial discrimination, was a crime against humanity under international law. 56 The TRC also stated that in making its findings 'the Commission was guided by international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions'. 57 The Appendix (in Volume 1) containing the TRC's finding that apartheid was a crime against humanity acknowledges that ipso facto created an international crime involving individual criminal responsibility, the granting of amnesties could be characterized as 'opting out' of the obligation to repress grave breaches of international humanitarian law. 
G. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the TRC's findings regarding the status of the crime of apartheid, no one sought or was granted amnesty for the practices of apartheid itself but for the gross violations of human rights (that also constituted crimes under South African law) carried out in order to enforce apartheid. The absence of an explicit reference to 'the crime of apartheid' in the ILC's 1996 Draft Code is indicative of a widespread belief that the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 had consigned both the concept and the attempts to criminalize it to history.
III. The Inclusion of the Crime of Apartheid in the Rome Statute
A. Introduction
The crime of apartheid was not included in the statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (or of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) despite a request for it to be included from the ICRC. 68 The The idea that the crime of apartheid should have been included in the list of crimes against humanity was originally made by the representative of Mexico. 71 The only recorded support for the Mexican proposal initially came from the representative of Ireland (on the grounds that apartheid was an example of a crime that could be committed outside the context of an armed conflict) 72 but it prompted the Chairman to note that '[i]t had been suggested that the crime of apartheid should be added to the list [of crimes against humanity]'. 73 At a subsequent meeting, several delegations expressed support for the express inclusion of apartheid in the list of war crimes. 74 humanity but pressure from Latin American countries in relation to enforced disappearances and from a group of primarily African states in the case of apartheid ensured that both were ultimately included in the definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute. 75 The formal proposal to add apartheid to the list of crimes against humanity was made by 10 countries; 76 the earlier proposal to include apartheid within the list of war crimes made by a sub-group of six African states was not proceeded with. 77 It has been asserted that the South African delegation was active in ensuring that the crime of apartheid was included in its own right and that the United States' delegation worked to ensure a narrow definition ensued. Given that Article 7(1)(h) criminalizes persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on (inter alia) racial or ethnic grounds, the crime of apartheid in the Rome Statute would appear to be limited to a residual category of inhuman acts not falling within the ambit of the concept of persecution 79 or 'other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health' 80 but requiring, in addition, the context of 'of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination' and the specific intent to maintain that regime. This residual category would appear to be either (i) any inhuman acts that did not cause great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health or (ii) acts that did not constitute 'the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law'. As Dugard has noted in relation to the Apartheid Convention, proving the necessary specific intention will be difficult to establish in practice against all but the political leaders responsible for the design and implementation of the ideology of apartheid.
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C. Conclusion
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case stated that the legal weight to be attached to the provisions of the Rome Statute had been correctly set out by Trial
Chamber II in Furundžija. 82 Namely that, although still a non-binding treaty at that stage, the text 'may be taken to express the legal position i.e. the opinio iuris of those
States' that attended the Rome Diplomatic Conference and adopted the Statute.
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Significantly, this formulation leaves out the qualifying phrase 'in many areas'. With regard to Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute, the crime of apartheid, its absence from any universally accepted major precedent confirms that it can only be viewed as progressive development.
Clark acknowledges that the addition of the crime of apartheid to the Rome Statute was more symbolic than anything else but observes that he took great joy in watching the representatives of those states that washed their hands of the Apartheid 79 Art. 7(2)(g) ICCSt. defines persecution as 'the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity'. 80 Art. 7(1)(k) ICCSt. A marginal note to the Elements of Crime -Art. 7(1)(j) Crime against humanity of apartheid states: 'It is understood that "character" refers to the nature and gravity of the act'. 81 Dugard, supra note 27, at 203. Convention 'sagely agreeing that the [Rome] Statute would be sadly incomplete unless something suitable including the word apartheid were added'. 84 Cassese argues that the fact that Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over the crime and the fact that Article 7(2)(h) provides a definition of the crime of apartheid 'might gradually facilitate the formation of a customary rule'. 85 Cassese also asserts that this development could occur if a case concerning 'inhuman acts' committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic racial oppression was ever brought before the ICC 86 but, given the limited nature of the ICC's jurisdiction, this would only be a possibility where a state had accepted the existence of the crime of apartheid as a treaty obligation by virtue of their ratification of the Rome Statute.
IV. The Principle of Legality and the Crime of Apartheid
One of the fundamental principles of both domestic and international criminal law is the principle of legality. 87 The core principle of legality embodies two guiding subprinciples. First, no one should be punished unless it was sufficiently clear and certain what conduct was forbidden before the accused acted (the principle of certainty or nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege certa). Secondly, no one should be punished for any act that was not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was done (the principle of non retroactivity or nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia).
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No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
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The wording of Article 11(2) implies that the failure to incorporate an international crime into domestic law does not breach the principle of legality 90 but the common law conception of the rule of law goes further and requires the express incorporation of even the most heinous violations of international law into domestic law before jurisdiction over an international crime can be said to exist. 91 Gallant asserts that '[t]his stronger version of legality is not required by customary international human rights law'. 92 Gallant also asserts that re-characterizing a crime from international law to domestic law does not raise jurisdictional issues because '[t]he forum state may characterize its criminal proceedings as an application of its own substantive criminal law on the basis of universal jurisdiction'. 93 Gallant acknowledges that his analysis only applies to crimes under customary international law (because customary international law applies everywhere) and that his position disregards the possibility of persistent objection. 94 With regard to many international crimes (particularly war crimes), the principle of foreseeability is satisfied by the fact that the conduct (e.g. murder (usually the intentional extra-judicial killing of noncombatants)) is clearly criminal under every domestic legal system in the world.
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V. Conclusion
In The particular significance of the Rome Statute is that, for the first time, apartheid has been criminalized in a manner that is consistent with penal legality and certainty. In R v. Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that '[t]he strongest source in international law for crimes against humanity, however, are the common domestic prohibitions of civilized nations'. 99 As noted in the introduction, the incorporation of new international crimes into the domestic criminal law of states is essential to ensure both normative alignment and source legitimacy for these transformative initiatives.
Unfortunately, in the case of the crime of apartheid, domestic implementation has not been uniform. Two crucial further facts also mitigate against a conclusion that apartheid is a crime against humanity under customary international law. First, notwithstanding the number of ratifications of the Apartheid Convention, it is remarkable that the vast majority of the parties to the Apartheid Convention failed to incorporate the crime of apartheid into their domestic law prior to the drafting of the Rome Statute, 108 and, secondly, the position taken by South Africa -still not a party to the Apartheid Convention -in the conjoined In Re South African Apartheid Litigation cases (i.e. its failure to assert that apartheid per se was a very serious crime under international law).
109
The new edition of Cassese's International Criminal Law acknowledges that Article 7 of the Rome Statute is broader than customary international law (because 'it broadens the classes of conduct amounting to crimes against humanity') in relation to the crime of apartheid but states that 'it could be argued that the [Rome] Statute has, however, contributed to recent formation of a customary rule on the matter'. 110 It is questionable whether the incorporation of the crime of apartheid into the domestic law of states that are parties to the Rome Statute can contribute to the formation of a customary rule because, as the ICJ observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, no inference can legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary law contained in a treaty provision from the behaviour of the parties to the treaty. 111 Of course, for a treaty with such widespread ratification as the Rome Statute (currently 122 parties), it becomes increasingly difficult to demonstrate state practice by states who are not parties, the so-called Baxter Paradox. 112 Meron has argued that Baxter overstated the nature and effect of the ICJ's statement that the practice of the parties to a convention lacks evidentiary weight in the creation of customary law and quotes the statement of the ICJ that 'very widespread and representative participation' in a convention 'might suffice of itself' to create a general rule of international law. National Laws in this area'. 115 It should be stressed that in order for the principle of legitimacy to be fully respected, it will be the adoption of this Model National Law into the domestic law of AU member states (and particularly those states who are not parties to the Rome Statute if the Baxter paradox is a reality) that will strengthen the argument for the crystallization of the crime of apartheid (as defined in the Rome
